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Abstract
Darwin concludes The Origin of Species with a splendid one-phrase poem,
From so simple a beginning
endless forms most beautiful and most wonderful
have been, and are being, evolved.
Darwin’s “simple beginning” may be identiﬁed, in today’s terminology, with dissipation—evolution’s basic
fuel. All the rest is commentary—or, more precisely, corollary.
One can aptly apply Darwin’s phrase to another kind of “simple beginning,” from which as well “endless
forms most beautiful and most wonderful have been, and are being, evolved.” What I have in mind is
a concept that is apparently the very antithesis of dissipation, namely, physics’ fundamental assumption
of invertibility—or “microscopic reversibility.” To paraphrase Dobzhansky, no sensible step can be taken
today in information, communication, and computer sciences, as well as in fundamental physics, except in
the light of invertibility.
Keywords: invertibility, irreversibility, computation, dynamics, thermodynamics, entropy, second law of
thermodynamics
1 Introduction
Darwin’s “simple beginning” in this paper’s abstract may be identiﬁed, in today’s
terminology, with dissipation—evolution’s basic fuel. Evolution is, in essence, an
advanced form of dissipative cascade—one which exhibits long-lived historical sym-
metry breakings, or, in Bennett’s terms, displays great logical depth[4].
1 tt@bu.edu
Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science 253 (2010) 3–16
1571-0661 © 2010 Published by Elsevier B.V.
www.elsevier.com/locate/entcs
doi:10.1016/j.entcs.2010.02.002
Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license.
Even though the laws of microscopic physics are presumed to be strictly invertible—
that is, distinct microscopic trajectories forever remain distinct—dissipation means
that, as time progresses, diﬀerent macroscopic states tend to merge into a same
macroscopic state. If you pour equal amounts of cream into two cups of tea, the
coarse swirls that you initially get in the two cups may look quite diﬀerent. As
time progresses and the swirls churn about and break up into ﬁner and ﬁner swirls,
the two macroscopic patterns will still look diﬀerent if compared pixel by pixel,
but overall they will tend to develop a similar fractal texture—the same statistics
for the frequency of swirls of a given size, for the two-point density correlations
of swirls, and so forth. The dissipative cascade by which coarse nonhomogeneities
gradually reshuﬄe themselves into ﬁner ones, yielding ever more complex structure
and subtler correlations, is a prototype of Darwinian evolution—literally, a uni-
verse in a cup of tea. But, inexhorably, the bulk of the distribution of feature sizes
shifts towards smaller and smaller swirls, sweeping most detail downwards to the
mesoscopic level, until ﬁnally the only diﬀerences that are left between the states
of the two cups are at the microscopic level. From the macroscopic viewpoint, the
two diﬀerent initial states have converged to a unique ﬁnal state of thermodynamic
equilibrium—in Kelvin’s words, the “heat death of the universe.”
It this scenario, the macroscopic progression is clearly irreversible—diﬀerent
states ﬂow into one and the same state. Moreover, entropy—intuitively, the amount
of disorder—grows monotonically until it attains the maximum allowed by the sce-
nario’s invariant constraints. 2
Let us turn our attention now to a drastically stylized kind of universe, namely,
John Conway’s well-known game of life[11], whose laws are, like those of our
physics, homogeneous, isotropic, time-invariant, deterministic, and locally acting
(no “action at a distance”)—in sum, a discrete version of a ﬁeld theory. (This
kind of systems, called cellular automata, were independently proposed by John
von Neumann[23] and Konrad Zuse[25] precisely to establish a common ground be-
tween automata theory and physics.) Let us initialize life to a state of high but
not maximal entropy—say, a region of mostly 1’s (“cream”) next to one of mostly
0’s (“tea”)—and set it going. What kind of behavior will we observe? (To help
intuition, Fig. 1 provide a time-lapse-photography sequence of this evolution.)
Speciﬁcally, to compare this domesticated scenario with the genuine physical
scenario discussed before, we may ask of each of them
(i) May complex structures and textures emerge at some point (possibly to be
readsorbed)?
(ii) Is the macroscopic progression irreversible?
(iii) Is entropy monotonically increasing? and
(iv) Is the microscopic law invertible?
2 The number of molecules of each kind, the total energy (if the system is isolated) or the temperature (if
it is in contact with a thermostatic environment), the system’s volume or pressure, etc.
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Fig. 1. life started from a state of high, but not maximal, entropy; t = 0, 2, 10, 258, 1054.
The answers, in the two cases, are
question teacup life
1 complex structures may emerge ys ys
2 irreversible macroscopics ys ys
3 monot. increasing entropy ys no
4 microscopic law invertible ys no
Note that, for questions 1 and 2, whether or not the microscopic law is invertible
doesn’t appear to make a critical diﬀerence; on the other hand, the answer to
question 3 seems to go hand-in-hand with that to question 4. In fact, we shall
see that the most symptomatic evidence for the second law of thermodynamics,
namely, the very irreversible decay associated with the monotonical increase of
coarse-grained entropy, is a characteristic indicator (in the sense of “if and only if”)
of microscopic reversibility. Paradoxically, it is the very “feature” of an invertible
system to be unable to forget its initial microscopic state that inexhorably leads
it—Alzheimer-wise—to progressively forget its initial macroscopic state! But I’m
getting ahead of myself.
For the moment, let us just remark that the two kinds of system show remark-
able diﬀerences in their life career. With an invertible dynamics (“teacup”), a
maximally disordered initial state will forever remain so. With a noninvertible dy-
namics (“life”), on the other hand, out of a maximally disordered initial state there
will often spontaneously emerge texture (spatial statistical correlations) which will
evolve (possibly growing macroscopic features of unbounded size) and ultimately
converge to a “limit texture” through a transient that may range from short and
banal to long and full of surprises—a veritable “history.” In the invertible case,
history can occur only if “fueled” by initial disequilibrium—and this fuel is obvi-
ously provided by the system’s state. In the noninvertible case, fuel for history is
also provided by the dynamics itself, which makes life easier—if you pardon the
pun. (Whether “life” achieved at this price can be as promising will have to be the
matter for another paper.)
One could aptly apply Darwin’s poetic phrase quoted above to another kind
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of “simple beginning,” from which as well “endless forms most beautiful and most
wonderful have been, and are being, evolved.” As you may guess, what I have
in mind is a concept that is apparently the very antithesis of dissipation, namely,
physics’ fundamental assumption of microscopic reversibility. (But aren’t opposites
often found to be the two sides of the same coin?) As we shall see, microscopic
reversibility—that is, the strict invertibility of a process—turns out to be an ex-
traordinarily productive constraint, whose impact is particularly evident in informa-
tion, communication, and computer sciences as well as in fundamental physics. To
paraphrase Dobzhansky[9], no sensible step can be taken today in those disciplines
except in the light of invertibility.
The backbone of chemistry is the conservation of atoms; of circuit theory, that
of charge; and of hydrodynamics, that of water; in a similar manner, information
theory and analytical dynamics are essentially suites of variations on the theme
of “conservation of information.” It’s not that the composer is strictly forbidden
to depart from that theme—that mechanics or information theory only deal with
invertible systems—but the music tends to get keyless and boring unless the invert-
ibility theme is recalled often, by imitation or by contrast.
2 Text compression, cryptography, and all that
For starters, let us consider a number of techniques that more or less knowingly we
have all been taking advantage of.
When we send an attachment with an email message, it is usually compressed
in order to save bandwidth. Most ordinary texts can easily be squeezed down to
between one-third and two-thirds of their original size. What is essential is that
this transformation be reversible, so that, by using an inverse transformation, the
recipient may able to reconstruct the original verbatim. We speak in this case of
lossless compression—since, intuitively, no “information” is lost. But in this scenario
it would be hard to establish an independent meaning for that word in isolation; all
we can say is that the entire phrase “no information is lost” just means the same
as “the transformation is reversible.”
In cryptography, the purpose is to transmit a message in an encoded form, so
that its contents will be hidden to everyone—including the material bearer of the
message—but recoverable in its entirety by a selected recipient. So, even though
the encoding must be reversible—as in the case of lossless compression—the means
to carry out the reverse process must be denied to anyone but the recipient. In
our age, cryptography is used on an industrial scale, as when you pay your phone
bill through the Internet. So encoding and decoding algorithms are standard and
essentially public-domain. All that remains conﬁdential is a key, that is, a small ad
hoc piece of passive data—a parameter—that is fed to the algorithm to customize
it for an individual client or transaction.
To insure reversibility, the decoding key should be matched to the encoding key,
and thus, at least in principle, reconstructible from it. Yet, like the access code for
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the oﬃce copier, it may be hard to keep an encoding key conﬁdential for long. From
what we just said, this would seem to imply that once the encoding key is known
the decoding key as well would soon cease to be a secret. The problem is gotten
around in practice by making the relation between encoding key and decoding key,
if not irreversible (which would be a contradiction in terms), at least extremely hard
to reverse[16].
There is a parallel here between the reversibility in principle postulated for mi-
croscopic physics and the irreversibility de facto of macroscopic phenomena, which
we are continually reminded of by the second law of thermodynamics. We’ll have
to say more about this in §4.
3 Invertibility and information conservation
From a category-theory viewpoint (see [12]), invertibility is in essence nothing but
“informationlossless” (ach!)—that is, intuitively, the capability for a dynamical pro-
cess to transform the state of a system without losing information that would allow
one to reconstruct the previous state. This connection between a transformation,
which operates on the individual microscopic states of a system, and information,
which is a quantitative attribute of a “state of knowledge,” 3 is conceptually subtle,
and will be elucidated below.
Brieﬂy, a dynamical system consists of set X of states and a rule, called transition
function or dynamics, that to each element of X associates one element of that same
set called its successor (this is indicated, in Fig. 2, by a directed arc). A dynamics
is invertible if each state has exactly one predecessor, 4 as in Fig. 2b.
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
(a) (b) (c)
Fig. 2. Three dynamics on the same set of eight states. Dynamics (b)—a typical case—isnoninvertible, as
there are states, such as 0 and 4, that have no predecessors, and others, such as 2 and 3, that have more
than one predecessor. (One can say that states 1 and 4, for example, “merge” into state 2.) Dynamics
(a) is an extreme case of noninvertibility, as all states merge into a single one. At the opposite extreme,
dynamics (c) is invertible, as there are no merges—each state has one and only one predecessor.
3 Namely, one specifying how likely it is, for any of the conceivable states, that the system be in that state.
4 Here we restrict our argument to ﬁnite systems. To properly deal with inﬁnite systems one would have
to introduce technicalities from topology and measure theory, arriving, in that more general context, at
substantially the same conclusions.
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In Fig. 2, suppose we express our knowledge about the state of the system at
a certain moment by a probability distribution P = 〈p1, p2, . . . p8〉; such a state of
knowledge is often called a “macroscopic state,” to distinguish it from the speciﬁ-
cation of a single element of the system, called “microscopic state.”
A dynamics over a set X automatically induces a dynamics over the (much
larger) set of all distributions over X. If all we knew about the initial state was,
for instance, that “it had an even label”—0, 2, 4, or 6—our lack of information
would be measured by the entropy X of the distribution P = 〈14 , 0,
1
4 , 0,
1
4 , 0,
1
4 , 0〉 =
1
4〈1, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0〉, namely,
X =
∑
i=0,...,7 pi log2
1
pi
= 4 · 14 log2 4 = 2bit.
Table (1) shows how the distribution P (we have left out the normalization factor
1/4) evolves with dynamics (a), (b), and (c) as we “turn the crank”:
t Pa Pb Pc
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
0 1 . 1 . 1 . 1 . 1 . 1 . 1 . 1 . 1 . 1 . 1 . 1 .
1 4 . . . . . . . . 1 1 2 . . . . . 1 . 1 1 1 . .
2 4 . . . . . . . . . 1 1 . 2 . . 1 . 1 . . 1 1 .
3 4 . . . . . . . . . . 1 . 1 2 . . 1 . 1 1 . 1 .
4 4 . . . . . . . . . . 2 . 1 1 . 1 . 1 . 1 1 . .
5 4 . . . . . . . . . . 1 . 2 1 . . 1 . 1 . 1 1 .
6 4 . . . . . . . . . . 1 . 1 2 . 1 . 1 . 1 . 1 .
7 4 . . . . . . . . . . 2 . 1 1 . . 1 . 1 1 1 . .
8 4 . . . . . . . . . . 1 . 2 1 . 1 . 1 . . 1 1 .
9 4 . . . . . . . . . . 1 . 1 2 . . 1 . 1 1 . 1 .
10 4 . . . . . . . . . . 2 . 1 1 . 1 . 1 . 1 1 . .
11 4 . . . . . . . . . . 1 . 2 1 . . 1 . 1 . 1 1 .
.
..
.
..
.
..
(1)
Note that, as a (microscopic) state is turned into a new state by the dynamics,
the weight associated with it in the distribution P “ﬂows” with it along the arcs of
Fig. 2; whenever two arcs merge, the contents of the corresponding two “bins” of the
distribution are poured together into a single bin—so that the distribution itself gets
coarser and its entropy accordingly decreases. In any dynamical system, therefore,
the microscopic, or “ﬁne-grained,” entropy is always a monotonically decreasing
function of time. In fact, even if were not told anything about the system’s initial
state, we may be able to pin down with increasing accuracy its state at a later
time—by just waiting. That is, if we precisely know the dynamics and how much
time has elapsed from system initialization, that alone may be enough to give us
some knowledge of the current state!
An extreme example of irreversibility is that of dynamics (a), where all states
ﬂow into a single state in one step. In this case, even if we had total lack of knowl-
edge about the initial state (distribution 18〈1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1〉, of maximal entropy),
already after one step we’d be sure the system would have settled into that distin-
guished state (distribution 18〈8, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0〉, of zero entropy).
T. Toffoli / Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science 253 (2010) 3–168
At the other extreme—dynamics (c)—we have the special case of a system that
happens to be invertible: since in this case states never merge, states and associated
bins are merely permuted by the dynamics. Since entropy is a symmetric function
of all its arguments (that is, it does not depend on the order of the bins), and all
that is changed by the dynamics in the present case is the bins’ order, the entropy
remains strictly constant. 5 So, if the dynamics is invertible, then information is
conserved.
4 The second law of thermodynamics
To complete the argument of the previous section—that the concepts of invertibility
and conservation of information are equivalent—we need to prove the converse of
the above, namely, that if a dynamics conserves the “amount of information” of all
possible “states of knowledge” (in other words, conserves entropy for all possible
distributions), then the dynamics itself is invertible. It would be hard to test all
possible distributions, since, these, unlike the states, are inﬁnite in number. How-
ever, it turns out that to prove our statement it is suﬃcient to verify its validity on
only a ﬁnite subset, namely, the “basis” consisting of those distributions where all
the mass is concentrated, in equal parts, on just two bins. In fact, if any two arcs
merge in the graph, this will be revealed by a drop of entropy in one of those basis
distributions.
What we have obtained so far is something one might call the “weak second law
of thermodynamics” (“weak” because so tautological), which states that
W2LT: The [ﬁne-grained] entropy of an invertible system is constant.
We can compare this with the (traditional) “second law of thermodynamics,”
which, in a form equivalent to Clausius’ original formulation, 6 states that
T2LT: The [thermodynamic] entropy of an isolated system grows monotonically.
Here, as per Clausius’ original deﬁnition (1854), entropy is a quantity characterized
(up to an additive constant) by the relation
ΔS = Q
(
1
T1
−
1
T0
)
where Q is the amount of energy that passes in the form of heat from a body at
temperature T1 to one at T0. Note that the temperature of a body is well-deﬁned
only if the latter is as close as desired to thermal equilibrium. By “state” here was
intended a thermodynamic state, characterized by the values of its macroscopically
measurable properties such as volume, pressure, temperature, chemical composition,
etc.; a few decades later, a thermodynamic state would have been interpreted as an
equivalence class of microscopic states, namely, all those microstates sharing those
particular values and thus consistent with that macroscopic description.
5 A constant function is only a special case of a monotonically decreasing function.
6 “Heat generally cannot ﬂow spontaneously from a material at lower temperature to a material at higher
temperature.”
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Boltzmann’s intuition was to interpret the entropy S of a thermodynamic state
directly in terms of the number Ω of microstates consistent with the given macrostate:
S = k lnΩ.
This led to a generalization of the concept of entropy, since now one could come
up with satisfactory characterizations of systems that are not at equilibrium—and
thus may not have a temperature—but still determine their entropy in a consis-
tent way by just counting the number of microstates that went along with that
characterization.
This new freedom opened the ﬂoodgates to a whole slew of new “entropies,”
each tied to what information one had and was willing or capable to use in order to
determine the makeup (and thus the microstate count) of a macrostate as it evolved
in time. Speciﬁcally, one had “coarse-grained” entropies, that depended on what
kinds of measurements one felt capable (or incapable) of performing. It is not so
much that entropy became a subjective quantity, as that it became clear that it is
a property of a description of a system rather than an intrinsic aspect of the system
itself. Some of these entropies have the property that they monotonically increase
only in the mean—the instantaneous value may ﬂuctuate about this mean and so
occasionally decrease, in contradiction with T2LT.
Even worse, one had Poincare´’s paradoxical “recurrence theorem,” whereby the
microstate of a large but ﬁnite system driven by an invertible dynamics would
eventually come back, possibly after an astronomical long time, to the original state.
In fact, as clear from Fig. 2c, in these systems every state lies on a cyclic trajectory.
Consequently, any macrostate, qua a class of microstates, would eventually 7 return
to the exact initial macrostate. If we treat entropy as an (even approximately)
measurable property of a physical state, we’d expect it to grow rapidly (with respect
to this astronomical scale) towards its maximum value, then coast very close to it
for almost the entire cycle, and then, just as rapidly as it went up, come down to
the initial value at the end of the cycle. then have to admit that at a moment very
distant in time its entropy would have come be back to the initial value.
It is clear that many of these “statistical-mechanical” variants of entropy lead to
violations of the traditional second law. Either this law is to remain valued today
merely for its antiquarian interest, or something else has to give.
We have proposed an interpretation that views the state of a system as the
“most honest state of knowledge” 8 that one can give for the current time 9 based
exclusively on one’s knowledge (from one’s own measurements or from somebody
else’s reports) of the initial state, one knowledge of the microscopic laws, and a
statement of the kind and amount of memory and computational resources that
one is able or willing to devote to integrating the equations of motion from that
initial state and for those laws.
7 Though in a time equal to the least common multiple of the lengths of all the orbits involved, and thus
exponential in the size of the macrostate.
8 In the tradition of de Finetti[8] and Jaynes[13].
9 Or any speciﬁed time, whether in the future or in the past.
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It turns out 10 that, with this approach, one can state a “strong second law of
thermodynamics,” namely,
S2LT: The [honest] entropy of an invertible system grows monotonically,
which is identical in formulation to the traditional law, 11 but whose content is
logically equivalent to the invertibility of the underlying dynamics—just as in the
weak law. In other words, if a system is microscopically reversible, then its macro-
scopic behavior will strictly obey the second law of thermodynamics (incidentally,
displaying macroscopic irreversibility and all that); conversely, if it obeys this law,
then it must be microscopically reversible. As simple as that!
5 Invertible computing
In all endeavors in which we try to get the most from nature—think of agriculture,
athletics, or steam power—we can’t go very far if we don’t ask questions about “the
nature” of nature—what are the fundamental resources and constraints—and have
the humility to accept the answers.
Computation, numeric or symbolic, whether done in one’s mind, with pencil
and paper, or on an electronic computer, is a way to concretely run abstract logic
arguments on a concrete physical substrate. Today, such a substrate is invariably
macroscopic; that is, both the logical variables—the bits—and the logic operators—
the gates—are realized by lumps of matter consisting, even in state-of-the-art im-
plementations, of millions of atoms each[24,6]. 12
To reduce the intrinsic noisiness, due to both fabrication tolerances (coarseness
of edges, inhomogeneity of composition) and operating conditions (thermal noise,
signal crosstalk) of such a substrate and approximate the ideal precision of logic, a
large amount of redundancy is used. For example, in a nonvolatile magnetic medium
such as a hard disk, to guarantee—against thermal noise—a mean relaxation time
of at least ten years for the states of the individual bistable elements (“bits”), these
have to be realized as metastable states with a stored energy of at least 65 times the
value kT characteristic of thermal agitation impacts—where T is the temperature of
the environment and k Boltzmann’s constant. When the state of a bit of magnetic
memory is changed, the energy of the original metastable state is typically dumped
and a new metastable state is built out of high-grade energy freshly drawn from the
power supply.
In principle, most of this energy could be recycled, much as when one brings a car
from a state of motion to one of rest not by converting the coherent kinetic energy
of the car into incoherent thermal agitation by means of the cheapest dissipation
device, namely the friction brake, and dumping it as heat, but by converting it
into electric energy by means of a braking dynamo and storing it into a battery
10This argument is brieﬂy sketched in [20]; a more scholarly version is in preparation.
11But note that growth is now monotonical vis-a`-vis the absolute time distance between initial and ﬁnal
states, since we are allowed to extrapolate the system’s evolution either forward or backwards in time.
12This for just the active volume, without counting ancillary (e.g., wires) and support (mechanical substrate,
power distribution, etc.) structures.
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as high-grade chemical energy. Of course, dynamo and battery represent a much
more expensive infrastructure than a simple disk brake (and the surrounding air
to cool it); the alternative is between a large one-time investment in permanent
infrastructure and a small daily operating charge—till the end of time—for “fuel
delivery” and “garbage collection.”
Assume an interest rate of zero, so that, by amortizing the investment over a
large enough number of years, one could set the yearly premium as close to zero
as desired; then the resources to be invested in the recycling infrastructure are
no longer a concern. In this scenario, could one dream of achieving 100% energy
recycling eﬃciency when writing a bit to memory—i.e., overwriting the old value
with an arbitrary new one? Suppose that the new value is 0; we are thus envisaging
a 1-bit register whose old value may have been 0 or 1 but whose new value must
deﬁnitely be 0, with a transition graph (“clear bit” operation) as in (2)a.
a b
old new
0→ 0
↗
1 1
old new
0, r→ 0, r
1, r→ 0, s
(2)
This is clearly a noninvertible operation, and as such cannot represent the micro-
scopic evolution of a physical system—or at least of a complete one: something
must be missing. One way out of this diﬃculty is to imagine that the system ac-
tually consists of two components, only one of which (the “logic” component X) is
shown in (2)a. In reality, another component, A (for “ancilla”), is ganged with X
such that whenever there is a state merge in X there is a concomitant state split
in A, as shown in (2)b, so that overall the transition is still invertible. Note that
if we only look at the logic component X of this ganged pair we still observe the
desired noninvertible behavior. On the other hand, if we only look at the ancilla
A, we see a nondeterministic transition—state r may remain unchanged or go to a
diﬀerent state s. Typically, the ancilla will be a thermal reservoir, and the clearing
of a logic bit, entailing a loss of entropy of 1 bit in the X subsystem, is inescapably
accompanied by a further randomization—a gain of at least one bit—of the thermal
reservoir; this is Landauer’s principle[15].
In brief, a 1-bit increase in the entropy of a thermal reservoir at temperature
T implies the thermalization of a quantity kT ln 2 of energy. Thus, the higher the
temperature T of the environment, the higher the energetic cost of getting rid of the
previous value when writing a new value to a memory location; intuitively, the cost
of getting rid of one unit of unwanted information (“garbage”) is proportional to
how much garbage is already “out there;” as a matter of fact, if we don’t take active
measures like cooling, it is the “out there” that will occasionally dump garbage onto
our own backyard!
How serious is the practical impact of Landauer’s principle? How large is the fee
that it extracts from us, in comparison with other charges that today we already
routinely pay to nature to have our computations done?
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In general, the serviceability of any kind of computer is maintained by a “pump”
(power supply and heat sink) that continually injects fresh predictability into the
system, typically in the form of high-grade energy, and drains away accumulated
unpredictability, in the form of heat. Today, the unpredictability generated within
the system comes from two sources. By far the larger fraction is due to imperfec-
tion of the macroscopic mechanisms: ripples of escaped mechanical energy must be
damped by frictional methods (e.g., cable terminators) so that they won’t show up
in unwanted places and interfere with critical operations. The need for damping
can be reduced by more precise design and fabrication of a computer’s primitive
logic elements—transmission lines and gates. In fact, frictional losses, which used
to be billions of times larger that those ascribable to “logic” losses (those that, as
we’ve just seen, must accompany any noninvertible logic step), have been reduced
so much in the last two decades that now they are only a few orders of magnitude
larger than the latter. At this rate, in a decade or two, logic losses will emerge as
a substantial fraction of the total computational budget.
Moreover, frictional sources of dissipation can in principle be lowered below any
set threshold by achieving suﬃcient control of the physical processes that underlie
mechanical computation; in this domain at least, Moore’s law has no end in sight.
Logic sources of dissipation, on the other hand, are intrinsic to the computational
procedure one intends to carry out, and can only be reduced by jointly
• Introducing logic primitives that, unlike the ubiquitous nand gate, are invertible
(cf. [3,18,10,2]);
• Rewriting the algorithms so as to make use of those invertible primitives and
avoid as far as possible the need for noninvertible logic operations; 13 and
• Contriving realistic physical eﬀects that implement those invertible primitives in
a physically invertible (or at least thermodynamically reversible) way. 14
The above three tasks characterize the ﬁeld of invertible computing.
Invertible computing is of course a prerequisite for quantum computing (see [2]),
which must run on that more specialized form of invertibility that is a fundamental
feature of quantum mechanics, namely, unitarity.
6 Green is not a pic-nic
The tension that we’ve seen above between invertibility and computation reveals
itself again when one tries to make discrete models of local interactions in distributed
(i.e., spatially extended) systems. Here, instead of diﬀerential equations one makes
recourse to recurrence relations (of which cellular automata are an example). It
turns out that most of these recurrence schemes cannot be plausible candidates, even
13Whether general-purpose computation can be carried out at all by an invertible mechanism or within an in-
vertible medium had been seriously questioned (cf., e.g., [7,1]), until it was ﬁnally shown that such a feat is in
principle possible, though generally at the cost of more complex computational infrastructure[3,17,18,10,5].
14Fine-grained, massively parallel computational schemes, such as invertible cellular and lattice-gas au-
tomata, have turned out to be very productive conceptual tools not only for physical models of physics but
also for imagining physical models of invertible computation[19,14,21].
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as toy models, for ultimate, microscopic physical interactions, because they need
to be “powered” to work. 15 The issue arises of whether, given a simple recurrence
scheme that happens to describe a desired behavior but requires power to operate,
one can devise an equivalent alternative scheme that can operate autonomously,
“without batteries,” and thus be a more plausible model of a primitive physical
eﬀect. Recent research[22] shows that this desideratum is in principle achievable
(except for a few, well-characterized exceptional cases), though typically requiring
deployment of much more extensive and complex mechanisms.
These results formalize a reasonable suspicion about ordinary recycling. Much
energy can be recycled, for example, by collecting used glass bottles as close as
possible to the source—say, by putting a recycling bin in a cafeteria. A little more
energy could be recovered (or, more precisely, less entropy generated) if one provided
separate bins for clear bottles, brown bottles, and green bottles—but clearly at
the cost of more infrastructure (ﬂoor space, more bins, trucking trips, etc.). A
point will be reached where the sheer cost of providing and maintaining the extra
infrastructure will oﬀset the raw energy-savings beneﬁts.
The design-and-outlay diﬃculties mentioned above, which beset schemes for
invertible computation within an extended ﬁne-grained medium that attempts to
model microscopic physics, turn out to be much less serious if instead of “generic
invertibility” one could restrict oneself to a more specialized form of invertibility,
as found in second-order systems[21] (an example is the symplectic structure of
classical mechanics). For that matter, why is physics symplectic (or, in the quantum
formulation, unitary)? Did God himself realize that generic invertibility was too
demanding a speciﬁcation to design a universe with, and backed up a little bit?
Or—a question we are investigating at this moment—do we get the second-order
“ﬂavor” of invertibility (with inertia and all that) for free from generic invertibility
as an emergent feature, when we look at the world at a slightly coarser resolution
than that of the most fundamental physics?
7 Conclusions
When you ﬁrst hear of Landauer’s principle (§5), your ﬁrst reaction is likely to
be, “What a bummer! If it were not for physics’ built-in invertibility, it would be
possible to get rid of garbage for free!” Or, “In a universe governed by Conway’s rule
of life, which is noninvertible, it is possible to have such a thing as a ‘glider gun,’
apparently a perpetual motion machine of the second order—a source of unlimited
free energy. Why wasn’t our world make like that?”
Well, if you had to design a universe in which something as interesting as yourself
would hopefully eventually spontaneously emerge,
15To give an analogy, one can model an oscillator by means of an LC circuit. But concrete, macroscopic
inductors and capacitors are lossy and thus cannot sustain constant-amplitude oscillations. However, by
putting an LC circuit in the feedback loop of that miraculous, universal device that is the operational
ampliﬁer (OA) one can synthesize an ideal oscillator from nonideal L’s and C’s. The catch is that, while an
LC circuit by itself doesn’t need a power supply, the latter is required for the operation of the operation of
an OA-assisted circuit.
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Q: Would you make its microscopic laws invertible or not?
I don’t know the answer to this question, though I’ve been thinking about it for
many years, and still I lean toward ‘yes’ on Mondays, Wednesdays, and Fridays,
‘no’ on Tuesdays, Thursdays, and Saturdays, and “I don’t want to think about it”
on Sundays. 16
I had a similar diﬃculty with another question related to computation in non-
invertible media, and in desperation I had resolved that when I die the ﬁrst thing I
would ask of God would be “Please tell me the answer to that!” But then one night
I saw the light all by myself, and with the help of a couple of friends we worked out
a simple, ﬁnal, complete solution[22]. 17 This goes to prove that questions of this
kind are after all scientiﬁc, serious, and answerable.
When he and I were conjecturing about question Q above, Norman Margolus
seriously quipped that invertibility is “The way to make your quarter play longest.”
If I wanted to be lazy and use some sort of anthropic principle, my own answer to
that question would be, “Well, I’m here; so invertibility is certainly one way to get
something interesting emerge.” Winston Churchill would probably have answered,
“Invertibility is the worst form of government for a universe, except for all those
others that God must have tried before.”
It is clear that the issue of invertibility has much to do with how to preserve
information (and, as Edward Fredkin remarked, once you accept special relativity
there is no intrinsic diﬀerence between memory and communication), pamper pro-
cess, and get rid of no longer needed information. In a few years, preoccupations of
this kind have moved from the stratospheric level of pure mathematics to the spe-
cialized but still rather stylized ballet of pure Alice, honest Bob, and wicked Eve in
a cryptographic soap opera, down to the ever more pressing technological business
of more eﬃcient computing; and are ﬁnally becoming terribly relevant to how best
to manage to live in a world with ten billion people. For each of these, by symmetry,
their own aﬀairs represent precious information to be protected and indispensable
processing to be fostered, while everyone else’s are most often indiﬀerent but both-
ersome noise when not competitive threat. With “incompressibility” of information
and ﬁniteness of resources, how can we invent a way for each of us to live like a king,
with our own castle and park, without denying almost everyone else—like in the
feudal periods that characterized most of “civilized” history—similar aspirations?
Asked whether he wouldn’t have liked to live in Pericles’ Athens, Isaac Asimov
answered, “I doubt it—statistically, I would have been a slave!”
Such are the productive pleasures of studying invertibility in the context of our
own world.
16Of course I agree with Don Lancaster (www.tinaja.com/glib/bashpseu.pdf) that “ﬁnding a source of
unlimited free energy would be the most unimaginably heinous crime possible against humanity. For it
would inevitably turn the planet into a cinder.”
17So when I die my ﬁrst question to God will be “How does quantum mechanics really work?”—unless, of
course, I get the Nobel prize ﬁrst, and my ﬁrst question will be the present one.
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